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V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE
There are a number of means available to belligerents for inducing compliance with the rules governing war's conduct. 1 In the event of unlawful
behavior on the part of an enemy remedial action may take the form of
direct protest and demand for compensation as vvell as for the punishment
of individual offenders. Assuming, however, that the unlawful behavior
in question has either been directly instigated by order of the enemy government, or at least performed with its sufferance, other measures will generally
prove necessary. 2 The injured belligerent may direct an appeal to neutral
states, requesting the latter to intervene for the purpose of bringing pressure
to bear upon the delinquent party. 3 And although neutral states have no
duty to protest against the commission of illegitimate acts of warfare it has
been frequently asserted that they have a right to do so. 4 Finally, the injured belligerent may resort to repressive measures-sanctions-in reaction
to unlawful behavior on the part of an enemy, measures which take the
form of reprisals or of punishing captured offenders as war criminals. It
is to these two latter categories of measures that attention will be directed
in the following pages.
1 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 300, for an enumeration of the types of remedial action
an injured belligerent may resort to in the event of unlawful behavior on the part of an enemy.
2 It may be, of course, that the primary purpose of protesting the unlawful behavior is to
influence world opinion against the offending belligerent. Protests may be communicated
direct to the enemy state, through a protecting power, a humanitarian organization acting
in the capacity of a protecting power, or any state not participating in the conflict.
3 Neutral states may provide their good offices to the belligerents with a view to settling
the con ttoversy.
4 "There can be no doubt that neutral States . . . may, either singly, or jointly and collectively, exercise intervention whenever illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare are committed
(1) by belligerent Governments, or (2.) by members of belligerent forces, if the Governments
concerned do not punish the offenders and compensate the sufferers. . . . But although neutral
States have without doubt a right to intervene, they have no duty to do so." OppenheimLauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 559-6o.-Experience has shown that it is particularly in warfare
at sea that neutral states have been vigilant to protest against unla:wful belligerent behavior,
even though such behavior may only directly concern for the moment the other belligerent.
The reason for this is the intimate relationship between observance of belligerent rights a11d
observance of neutral rights, violations of the former being either concomitant with or leading
to violations of the latter. Needless to say, the effect of such neutral intervention will be directly
proportional to the strength of the neutral states and the vigor with which protests are pressed.
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A. REPRISALS

As between belligerents reprisals are acts, otherwise unlawful, which are
exceptionally permitted to one belligerent as a reaction against illegal acts
of warfare committed by an enemy. 5 It is generally acknowledged that
5 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 3Ioa. In a recent survey of the problem of war reprisals
the latter are defined as "otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare which under certain conditions
may legally be used by a belligerent against the enemy in order to deter the enemy from a
repetition of his prior illegal acts and thus to enforce compliance with the generally recognized
rules of war." A. R. Albrecht, "War Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva
Conventions of I949," A. ]. I. L., 49 (I953), p. 59o.-It is preferable that a distinction be
drawn between 'reprisals', in the strict sense of the term, and other 'collective measures' a
belligerent may take, particularly against the population of an occupied territory. Whereas
both types of measures involve the principle of collective responsibility, the basis for and
consequences of these two types of measures differ. The legal basis for a reprisal-in the strict
sense-must be an unlawful act ordered or authorized by the enemy government, or at least
an unlawful act performed by the armed forces of an enemy which-though performed without
higher authorization-is not met with measures of repression and (possibly) of compensation.
Illegitimate acts of warfare may be performed by individuals-particularly by the enemy
population in occupied territory-which cannot be attributed either directly or indirectly to
the enemy state. As against these latter acts a belligerent appears to be permitted by customary
law to take collective measures of repression, so-called "colkctive sanctions." In the war
crimes trials held after World War II there does not appear to have been a case involving reprisals
in the strict sense. Instead, the trials involving so-called "reprisals" dealt in reality with the
measures of repression taken by Germany against civilian populations in occupied territories
for allegedly illegitimate acts of warfare performed by individual members of the population.
In two trials a distinction was drawn between reprisals-in the strict sense-and other collective measures of repression. In the Trial of Hans Rauter the Netherlands Special Court of Cassation declared that: "In the proper sense one can speak of reprisals only when a State resorts, by
means of its organs, to measures at variance with International Law, on account of the fact
that its opponent-in this case the State with which it is at war-had begun . . . to commit
acts contrary to International Law .. ."Law Reports . •. I4 (I949), p. I32.· In the second trial
an Italian Military Tribunal at Rome stated that "the right to take reprisals arises only in
consequence of an illegal act which can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to a State. On
the other hand, if civilian citizens of the occupied State commit criminal acts within the occupied territory which harm the occupying state, and if the search for the culprits proves to be a
matter of considerable difficulty, partly owing to the solidarity of the population, it is permissible to impose collective sanctions." In re Kappler, [I948], Annual Digest and Reports of Public
International Law Cases, (I948), Case No. Ip, p. 472.. At the same time, most tribunalsparticularly the American and British-insisted upon referring to the collective measures taken
against civilian populations in occupied territories as "reprisals," thereby obscuring the fact
that there are important differences between these measures and the measures belligerents may
take against illegitimate acts of warfare performed by the armed forces of a state under the
command or authorization of the government. There is no intention here of undertaking an
analysis of these trials. It is sufficient only to state that despite a lack of uniformity in certain
respects over the restrictions imposed upon a belligerent occupant in taking hostages and socalled "reprisal prisoners" (and even of executing them in the event of absolute necessity),
there was a general consensus that such collective measures were-in principle-permitted,
but that Article 50 of the I907 Hague Regulations (IV) demanded, at the very least, that a
clear connection be established between the victims of collective measures and the illegal
actions which gave rise to these measures. See, for example, the Hostages Trial (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others) Trials of War Criminals, II (I95o), pp. I2.4_9-53 and the Einsatzgruppen
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since the purpose of reprisals is to induce compliance with the laws of war
reprisals should not be resorted to merely for revenge but only as a last
resort in order to compel an enemy to desist from unlawful behavior. For
this reason the injured belligerent should attempt, whenever possible, to
obtain cessation of the illegal acts (and appropriate redress) through means
other than reprisals. It is always preferable that if measures of reprisal
are finally resorted to the order to employ them should emanate from the
highest authority. However, in circumstances of urgent necessity it is
conceded that subordinate military commanders may, on their own initiative, order appropriate reprisals. In all cases, reprisals must be terminated
once they have achieved their objective, which is to induce a belligerent
to desist from unlawful conduct and to comply with the rules regulating
the conduct of war. 6
According to customary law measures of reprisal may be directed generally against the persons and property of an enemy. There need be no connection between the individuals performing the unlawful acts which give
rise to the right of reprisal and the individuals made the objects of retaliatory measures. In a word, the essential principle characterizing measures
of reprisal is that of collective responsibility. However, as between the
parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the individuals (and their property)
who may be made the objects of reprisals have been substantially restricted.
For these Conventions prohibit the taking of reprisals against any of the
several categories of individuals afforded the protection of the Conventions. 7
But apart from the prohibitions contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Trial (U. S. v. Otto Ohlendorf et al.), Trials of W ar Criminals, 4 (r95o), pp. 460 ff. It is, in fact,
precisely this latter requirement that clearly illustrates the difference in the legal consequences
attached to illegitimate acts of warfare which may be attributed directly or indirectly to the
state, and the legal consequences attached to similar acts which cannot be so attributed. In
the former cases the reactions are properly termed reprisals, and according to customary law
reprisals may be directed against any or all of the population or property of the offending state.
In the latter cases (of so called "reprisals," or, more accurately, "collective sanctions") the
objects of repression are much more narrowly circumscribed by the customary law. The distinction was well summarized in the Kappler case, cited above, where it was declared that the
legal consequence of reprisals is that "the-injured state may effect any interest of the injuring
state by means of reprisals." But the "collective santions" other than reprisals, "arises only
if a strict connection, either in respect to the locality or in respect of the service or office, can
be established between the authors-of an attack and the civilian population" (pp. 474-9).
6 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 3rob. It must be noted that a large measure of uncertainty
characterizes many of the customary rules, summarized above, allegedly regulating the resort
to reprisals. Thus it is by no means clear-at least not from belligerent practice-that reprisals
may be resorted to only when other means prove to be of no avail. In recent maritime warfare
belligerents have but rarely sought to take other remedial measures against allegedly unlawful
behavior before resorting to reprisals. In many instances reprisals have been taken at the fitst
possible opportunity, the belligerents seemingly welcoming the opportunity presented by ~n
enemy's actions to escape from rules found to be unduly restrictive (see pp. 3o-1, r88-9o).
7 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 31oe and notes thereto.
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the only remaining restriction 8 laid upon belligerents is that forbidding
retaliatory measures which are out of all proportion to the unlawful
behavior forming the basis of the reprisals. 9

B. PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS
\Var crimes may be defined as acts which violate the rules regulating the
conduct of war and which result in the liability to punishment of the perpetrators.10 According to customary international law belligerents have
s At least this is the only remaining restriction laid upon belligerents in resorting to reprisal
action directed exclusively against enemy persons and property. Quite different considerations arise in the case of inter-belligerent reprisals which affect neutral rights (see pp. 188-90,
254-8). The restrictions placed upon inter-belligerent reprisals adversely affecting neutral
interests-assuming the legitimacy, in principle, of such measures-ought not to be confused
with the restrictions operative solely as between belligerents.
9 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 31oc-This latter restriction has never been easy to apply,
if only for the reason that measures of reprisal need not consist of the same measures as the
original illegality. Nor has it ever been entirely clear whether the "proportionality" required
of reprisals must be judged by the character of the enemy's unlawful behavior or by the measures
necessary to compel the enemy to desist from such behavior. In the main, the weight of authority has tended to emphasize the former as providing the proper criterion for judging the "proportionality of reprisals." Yet there is a good deal to be said for the latter criterion, since
the real purpose of reprisals is to compel an enemy to desist from unlawful behavior. For
a review of the principle reprisal measures taken by the naval belligerents in the two W or 1d
Wars, see pp. 296-315.
Prior to 1914 there had been no significant attempt to resort to retaliatory measures in maritime warfare for over a century, and it is not surprising to find reprisals being dismissed in the
years preceding World War I as "an almost wholly obsolete form of action." U. S. Naval
War College, International Law Discussions, I90J, p. 43· It need hardly be pointed out that this
opinion reflected the extremely favorable conditions attending the conduct of naval hostilities
during the nineteenth century. These conditions did not obtain during the two World Wars,
and as a consequence the belligerent resort to reprisals formed one of the regular features of
naval hostilities. Elsewhere (see pp. 3o-2) the question has been raised as to what extent
the reprisal structure erected by the belligerents may be considered as having served a ''legislative" function, i. e. of subverting the traditional law, rather than an enforcement function.
Certainly this question admits of no easy and sweeping answer, and although it is quite clear
that in numerous instances belligerent reprisals have succeeded in replacing traditional rules,
in other instances the effect of reprisals upon the traditional law is still far from apparent.
Even greater caution must be exercised in evaluating the effects of reprisal measures bearing
adversely upon neutral rights (see pp. 193-5, 315-7).
10 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 320 for a definition and an enumeration of representative
war crimes. Although, in the main, war crimes have reference to illegal acts of warfare
committed by members of the armed forces of belligerents, it should be noted that war crimes
may be committed by civilians as well. Generally speaking, the classification of an act as a
war crime has been held to follow from the fact that the act performed has a direct relation
to the conduct of war and, at the same time, is prohibited by the law of war. War crimes in
the narrow and traditional sense, as defined above, are to be clearly distinguished from so called
'crimes against peace,' i.e., acts which consist in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of an unlawful war. The distinction between 'crimes against peace' and war crimes in the
narrow sense (as well as the distinction between 'crimes against humanity,' and war crimes)
was initially set forth in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
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the obligation to punish their own nationals found violating the law of
war and the right-in principle-to punish captured enemy individuals
who have committed similar acts. 11 Prior to World War II, however,
Nuremberg, and followed by the American military tribunals in the 'subsequent Nuremberg
proceedings' as well as by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal).
In recent years the term war crimes has been used not infrequently to refer to 'crimes against
peace' (and 'crimes against humanity') in addition to violations of the rules governing war's
conduct. Unfortunately, one result of this usage has been to obscure the fact that there is
no novelty attached either to the concept of war crimes-in the narrow sense-or to the punishment of individuals who violate the rules regulating the conduct of war. So far as war crimes
in the traditional sense are concerned, the novelty of the post World War II period must rather
be found in the number of enemy individuals charged with war crimes, in the vigor with which
they were tried and punished, in the development of the rules governing the procedure of war
crimes tribunals, and-very important-in the marked extension of the limits of individual
responsibility for violations of the laws of war. A lucid review of state practice prior to
World War II with respect to war crimes is given by Lord Wright, History of The United Nations
War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Law of War (1948), pp. 4o-86. The literature
to which World War II developments have given rise is vast and-as might be expectedfrequently controversial in character. Perhaps the most useful source for the decisions of war
crimes tribunals in this later period is the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, consisting of
15 volumes, and selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission over
the years 1946-49. Volume 15 contains a systematic analysis and summary of the 89 representative decisions (which do not include, however, the trials of the major war criminals before
the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals) reported in the first 14 volumes.
In the period following the termination of hostilities in 1945 the United States alone conducted
956 war crimes trials involving over 3,ooo defendants.
11 Provided the most rudimentary requirements were fulfilled, the customary law traditionally
permitted each belligerent to establish its own system of tribunals, to create its own procedure
to govern the trial of war criminals, and to impose whatever penalties it deemed just upon
individuals found to have committed war crimes. This was, at least, the situation that prevailed prior to World War II, belligerents having only the obligation-under international
law-to refrain from imposing punishment upon captured members of an enemy's armed forces
accused of war crimes without first granting the accused the benefit of a "trial." However,
as a result of state practice during and following the second World War, and in consequence of
obligations undertaken in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, the situation formerly prevailing with respect to the trial of captured enemy personnel
accused of war crimes has been substantially altered. The cumulative effect of these recent
developments has been to impose upon belligerents the obligation to accord the accused certain
minimum requirements of a "fair trial." These procedural requirements of a fair trial were
originally set forth in section IV of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and subsequently endorsed by other war crimes tribunals-national and international. They provide that the accused be informed of the charges made against him in a
language he understands, that he have adequate time to prepare his defense, that he.have aid
of counsel, that he be permitted to attend trial and to give evidence, and that he have an interpreter if needed.-The 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war provides-Article 102that a prisoner of war "can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by
the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been
observed." The effect of this provision is to guarantee enemy prisoners on trial for war crimes
the minimum requirements of a fair trial, summarized above. However, if a state goes beyond
these minimum requirements for members of its own armed forces, then it must grant the same
procedure to prisoners of war on trial for war crimes.-Finally, it may be noted that in reviewing
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some doubt had existed as to whether or not a. belligerent was entitled to
exercise jurisdiction over individuals accused of war crimes when the acts
in question were not performed either on the territory of the belligerent or
against its nationals. But in the light of recent practice it now appears
clear that the right of a belligerent to exercise such jurisdiction is limited
neither to offenses having a particular geographical location nor to offenses
committed against the nationals of the belligerent claiming jurisdiction. 12
In addition, there is no rule of customary law preventing a belligerent from
trying and punishing war criminals during the period following the termination of active hostilities but prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty,
though the past practice of states has not been to continue proceedings
against indivicluals accused of war crimes once peace has been re-established . 13
the nature of the penalties imposed upon war criminals by Allied courts and tribunals after
World War II, one authoritative source has concluded that "despite the fact that international
law has previously permitted the death sentence to be passed for any war crime, some kind of
international practice is growing according to which Allied Courts, apart from avoiding
inhumane punishment, have themselves attempted to make the punishment fit the crime; any
habitual practice of this kind would tend in time to modify the general rule that any war crime
is punishable by death." Law Reports . . . 15 (1949), p. 2.01.
12 It is generally agreed that post World War II practice has firmly established the so-called
principle of "universallty of jurisdiction over war crimes," thereby permitting belligerents to
exercise jurisdiction over individuals accused of war crimes without regard to the place where
an offense was committed or to the nacionality of the victims. In its most general form this
principle might well be interpreted to permit neutral states to try and punish war criminals
who fall under their control. But there is no record of neuLral states making such an attempt:,
and the right of neutrals to do so remains doubtful.
13 "We cannot say that there is no authority to convene a (military) commission after hostilities have ended to try violations of the Law of War committed before their cessation, at
least until peace has been officially recognized by treaty or proclamation of the political branch
of the Government. In fact, in most instances the practical adminiscration of the system of
military justice under the Law of War would fail if such authority were thought to end with
the cessation of hostilities. For only after their cessation could the greater number of offenders
and the principal ones be apprehended and subjected to trial." In re Yamashita, 32.7 U. S. I
(1946). Of course, an armistice agreement terminating hostilities may itself make provision
for the trial of war criminals. But if it does not belligerents may nevertheless prosecute those
enemy individuals accused of war crimes who fall under their control. Following World War
II the trial of German nationals accused of war crimes before Allied courts and tribunals was
based not only upon the customary right of belligerents to try and punish violators in their
tribunals but also upon the unconditional surrender of Germany and the assumption of supreme
authority over Germany by the four occupant Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union). The legal basis for the trial of Japanese war criminals was expressly
provided for in the armistice terms by which Japan unconditionally surrendered to the victorious
United Nations. On the other hand, the effect of a peace treacy is to bring to a close the right
to prosecute war criminals, unless the treaty of peace itself makes express provision to the
contrary. Such provision was made after World War I in Articles 2.2.7 and 2.2.8 of the Treaty
of Versailles. And in the 1947 peace treaties concluded between the Allied and Associated
Powers and Bulgaria, Finland, Rumania, and Italy, provision was also made for the trial of
persons accused of committing war crimes (as well as crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity).
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It is an interesting fact that among the war crimes trials held during and
since the second World War only a relatively small number concerned
violations of rules regulating the actual conduct of hostilities. 14 In part,
this may be explained by a reluctance to try members of the armed forces
of the defeated states for the violation of rules whose status is no longer a
rna tter of certainty. 15 In part, the dearth of trials concerned with infractions of the rules regulating the actual conduct of hostilities may be attributed to the conviction that where both sides in a conflict openly departed
from the established law, the requirements of justice forbade the prosecution of only those who happened to be on the defeated side. 16
There is little question, however, but that the commission of certain
acts during the course of hostilities at sea must continue to be regarded as
resulting-in the absence of special reasons to the contrary-in the individual (criminal) responsibility of the perpetrators. The unnecessary use
of force particularly as against the merchant vessels of an enemy, the
denial of quarter at sea, the firing upon survivors of sunken ships, the failure
to search out and make provision for the survivors of sunken vessels when
military interests so permit, the deliberate attack upon hospital vessels or
other vessels granted special immunity, and the misuse of the Red Cross
emblem constitute a summary of only the more important acts the com14 So far as naval hostilities are concerned, these reported trials have all been cited in a previous
section dealing with the attack upon and destruction of enemy vessels (see pp. 7o-3). There
are no records at all of trials relating to illegitimate conduct in aerial warfare. Law Reports
. .. 15 (1949), pp. 109-12.. The great bulk of the war crimes trials dealt instead with offenses
committed against prisoners of war and the civilian inhabitants of occupied territory.
15 The American military tribunal in the I. G. Farben Trial took note of this point by stating
that: "It must be admitted that there exist many areas of grave uncertainty concerning the
laws and customs of war . . . Technical advancement in the weapons and tactics used in the
actual waging of war may have been made obsolete, in some respects, or may have rendered
inapplicable, some of the Hague Regulations having to do with the actual conduct of hostilities
and what is considered legitimate warfare. But these uncertainties relate principally to military and naval operations proper and the manner in which they shall be conducted." (Trial of
Carl Krauch and Twenty Two Others), Law Reports . . . 10 (1949), pp. 48-9.
16 It was this consideration, among others, that the International Military Tribunal gave
expression to in refusing to assess the sentence of Admiral Doenitz ''on the ground of his breaches
of the international law of submarine warfare." Elsewhere (seep. 302.(n)) it is submitted that
in so far as the "facts" upon which the Tribunal allegedley based this aspect of the judgment
were held to justify refusal of sentence for the sinking without warning of neutral 11?-erchant
vessels-serious objections must be raised. With respect to the facts held to justify refusal of
sentence for the sinking without warning of enemy merchant vessels the matter is admittedly
quite different (see pp. 67-9). There are no reported trials of naval personnel for the act of
having attacked enemy merchant vessels without first attempting to seize such vessels and put
passengers and crew in a place of safety before resorting to destruction. The argument that
this failure to try individuals for the attack without warning of enemy merchant vessels point~
to the desuetude of the traditional rules-at least as these rules apply to submarine and aircraft~·
is difficult to accept, however.
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mission of which may result in a liability to punishment upon capture by
an enemy. 17
Where individuals have been charged with the commission of war crimes
the principal difficulty has been that of determining what recognition ought
to be given the defense plea that the acts in question were performed either
by order of the belligerent government or on the command of a superior . 18
Prior to World War II the attitude of states-and the opinions of writers on
the law of war-had varied with respect to the treatment to be accorded the
plea of superior orders, though a relatively strong case may be made on
behalf of the assertion that illegitimate acts of warfare performed by direct
order of the state were not considered to result in the individual responsibility of those performing such acts. 19
A decided change from earlier opinion and practice occurred both during
and after the 1939 war. While that conflict was still in progress several of
the belligerents amended their military manuals to provide that a violation
of the law of war is not deprived of its character of a war crime, and does not
confer upon the actor immunity from punishment, simply for the reason
that it was performed in response to the order of a belligerent government
17 And quite apart from the liability incurred as a result of misconduct during the course of
naval hostilities there is-of course-a further liability for those acts involving the maltreatment of the sick, wounded and shipwrecked members of an emeny's armed forces carried on
board belligerent warships (see pp. 135-7, for a discussion of liability resulting from "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked).
18 The plea that illegitimate acts of war were perforned for reasons of military (or "operational") necessity has already been considered in another connection (see pp. 36-7).
19 The issues raised by the above statement are rather complicated, and their relevance to
this study is distinctly limited-particularly in view of World War II practice. Nevertheless,
some comment-however brief-is required. It will be noted, to begin with, that a distinction
is drawn between illegitimate acts of warfare performed by order of the state and similar acts
performed by command of a superior. It is very doubtful whether the plea of superior orders
(i. e., whether or not the plea of superior orders should be accepted as a defense) has ever been
directly or indirectly regulated by international law. Instead, the acceptance or rejection of
this plea has been a matter left by international law to the discretion of the individual states.
On the other hand, the fact that an illegitimate act of warfare was performed by order of the
state (i. e., was an "act of state") was generally regarded as sufficient to divest the act of its
character as a war crime (acts of espionage and war treason formed clear exceptions to the rule)
according to international law. Against those acts which had the character of acts of state
the injured state could take collective sanctions-i. e., reprisals-but international law was
generally considered as excluding the individual (criminal) liability of the perpetrators. This
followed from the rule of general international law which normally forbade one state from
exercising jurisdiction in its courts over the acts of another state, i. e., from exercising jurisdiction over individuals performing acts possessing the character of acts of state. As will
presently be noted, however, recent practice appears to have firmly established that the act of
state doctrine is no longer appli-cable to acts having the character of violations of the law of
war; the fact that an individual has performed an illegitimate act of warfare by order of the
state does not deprive the act of its character as a war crime-though, of course, this circumstance may serve to mitigate punishment.
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or a superior. 20 In the period following the termination of hostilities
Allied courts and tribunals charged with the task of trying individuals
accused of war crimes have uniformly endorsed this prindple. 21
At the same time, it has been the consensus of judicial opinion that in
order to establish responsibility the person must know, or have reason to
know, that the act he is ordered to perform is unlawful under international
law. 22 Thus if the rule that allegedly has been violated is itself controversial or if-though of unquestioned validity-the rule has been departed
from under the conviction that such departure forms a legitimate measure
20 Both the American and British field manuals were altered in 1944. The 1944 change to
the U. S. Army's Rules of Land Warfare (paragraph 345) provided, however, that if violations
of the laws of war were performed by order of a belligerent government or a superior this fact
could be "taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in
mitigation of punishment." On the other hand, the British Manual of Military Law
(paragraph 443) allowed the plea of superior orders to operate only as a factor in the
mitigation of punishment, though liability was made dependent upon a knowledge that the
act performed was clearly unlawful. Subsequently, Article 8 of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal declared that: "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires." A substantially
similar provision formed a part of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal For the
Far East and of the various United States theatre regulations governing the trial and punishment of individuals accused of war crimes.
2t A summary of these decisions is given in Law Reports . .. 15 (r949), pp. rs7-6o.
22 In the Peleus Trial (Law Reports . . . I (1947), pp. r-2.r) the defendants, other than the
captain (whose defense was "operational necessity," see p. 73(n)), pleaded the defense of
superior orders. It was established during the course of the trial, held before a British Military
Court sitting at Hamburg, that most of the accused had known that the captain's command to
fire at helpless survivors struggling in the water-the war crime for which they were jointly
charged-was not a lawful command. As against the defense argument that many rules of
international law were vague and uncertain the Judge Advocate ruled "that if this were a case
which involved the careful consideration of the question whether or not the command to fire
at helpless survivors struggling in the water was lawful in International Law, the Court might
well think that it would not be fair to hold any of the subordinates accused in this case responsible for what they were alleged to have done. In the present case, however, it must have
been obvious to the most rudimentary intelligence that it was not a lawful command," (pp.
14-5). All of the accused were convicted by the Court.
The requirement of knowledge has been given prominence in recent formulations of the plea
of superior orders in military manuals. See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 33ob (r). And
paragraph 509 of the recently revised U.S. Army Rules of Land Warfare declares:
"The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a superior authority,
whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character of a war crime,
nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know
and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful.
In all cases where the order is held not to constitute a defense to an allegation of war crime,
the fact that the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation
of punishment.
"In considering the question whether a superior order constitutes a valid defense, the cour-t
shall take into consideration the fact that obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of
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of reprisal, either circumstance 1nay prove sufficient to relieve the actor of
responsibility. 23 Furthermore, it would appear that if an individual
though knowing that the act he has been ordered to perform is unlawful
nevertheless has acted under duress this circumstance rna y be taken in to
consideration either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. 24
What has been termed the "inverse case" 25 of superior orders concerns
the scope of the responsibility commanding officers must bear for illegitievery member of the armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in conditions of war
discipline, to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received; that certain rules of
warfare may be controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a war crime may be
done in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same time it must be
borne in mind that members of the Armed Forces are bound to obey only lawful orders."
23 Apart from the more obvious objections that have been urged against the practice of
holding individuals responsible for unlawful acts carried out in pursuance of an order by a
superior authority, the two circumstances cited above have been singled out for special attention
by critics. Yet a survey of the war crimes trials held after World War II indicates that the
uncertainty of the law was seldom involved, the one major exception being the cases involving
'collective measures' taken against occupied populations. It may also be observed that in the
few trials concerning violations of the rules regulating hostilities at sea there are no instances
in which individuals were punished for the violation of controversial rules or for the violation
of rules committed in the belief that such violations constituted instead legitimate measures of
reprisal. Thus there was never any pretense to the effect that the so-called "Laconia Order"
(see pp. 72-3) represented a legitimate reprisal measure.
24 See Law of Naval Warfare, Section 33ob (r), the last sentence of which corresponds to the
statement made in the text above-and notes thereto.-One may be said to act under duress if
the act is performed under an immediate threat-particularly a threat of physical coercion-in
the event of noncompliance with the order. But the threat must be, in the words of one
tribunal, "imminent, real and inevitable," it must pose a danger "both serious and irreparable."
The Einsatzgruppen Case (U.S. v. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.)Trial of War Criminals, 4 (r95o), p. 480.
A review of the trials in which the plea of duress was considered does not reveal, however, any
marked uniformity in the treatment of the plea. Courts differed over those precise circumstances
that could be held to justify the plea of duress; and they also differed over whether durec;s, even
when admitted in principle, could serve only in mitigation of punishment or as a complete
defense against the charge of having committed a war crime. The decisions bearing upon the
plea of duress have been summarized in the following manner:
"The general view seems . . . to be that duress may prove a defense if (a) the act charged
was done to avoid an immediate danger both serious and irreparable; (b) there was no other
adequate means of escape; (c) the remedy was disproportionate to the evil. According to the
decision in the Krupp Trial, these tests are to be applied according to the facts as they were
honestly believed to exist by the accused. Finally, if the facts do not warrant the successful
pleading of duress as a defense, they may constitute an argument in mitigation of punishment."
Law Reports . . . 15 (r949), p. 174·
25
See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., p. 572.) where responsibility of the nature discussed
above is said to arise "directly and undeniably, when the acts in question [i.e., unlawful acts
of subordinates] have been committed in pursuance of an order of the commander concerned,
or if he has culpably failed to take the necessary measures to prevent or suppress them. The
failure to do so raises the presumption-which for the sake of the effectiveness of the law
cannot be regarded as easily rebuttable-of authorization, encouragement, connivance, acquiescence, or subsequent ratification of the criminal acts."
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mate acts of warfare performed by subordinates. 26 There is no question
but that military commanders are liable for the unlawful acts they have
ordered or authorized subordinates to perform. Equally well established
is the responsibility of military com1nanders for the illegal acts of subordinates which the former had knowledge of but failed to take adequate
measures to control. By the failure to suppress unlawful acts of subordinates as are known to tnilitary commanders, the presumption of acquiescence in these acts must arise. It is clear, therefore, that the responsibility
of commanders can result solely from inaction, though here it is inaction
based upon a knowledge that unlawful acts of subordinates have been
committed. Finally, it would appear that the responsibility military
commanders must bear for the acts of subordinates implies a further duty to
take reasonable measures to insure that the latter will refrain from unlawful
behavior, and, should unlawful behavior nevertheless occur, to discover
and control the misconduct of subordinates. Where the failure to take precautionary or preventive measures is palpable and gross military commanders have been held liable for the unlawful behavior of subordinates even
though without actual knowledge of such behavior. 27
26 The numerous cases that have come before war crimes tribunals involving the responsibility
of military commanders for acts of subordinates are reviewed in Law Reports . . . rs (r949),
pp. 65-78. See also Law of Naval Warfare, Section 33ob (2.) and notes thereto. Paragraph
sor of the U. S. Army Rules of Land Warfare reads:
"In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons subject to their control. Thus, for
instance, when troops commit massacres and atrocities against the civilian population of occupied territory or against prisoners of war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual
perpetrators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility arises directly when the acts
in question have been committed in pursuance of an order of the commander concerned. The
commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through
reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary
and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof.''
27 The statements made in the text above are believed to represent a reasonably accurate
summary of the numerous-and occasionally conflicting-decisions relating to the scope of
a commanding officer's responsibility for acts of subordinates. A review of these decisions
indicates that perhaps the central issue giving rise to uncertainty-and controversy-has been
the liability incurred by military commanders who are unaware of the offenses committed by
subordinates but who have failed to take reasonable measures to prevent such offenses andonce committed-have made little effort to discover and control them. In this connection
the Trial of General Yamashita (Law Reports . . . 4 (r948), pp. r-95) is instructive. Tried before
an American Military Commission, General Yamashita was charged and convicted of failing
''to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United
States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines ·. . . "(3-4). Although
the prosecution asserted that Yamashita must have known of, and permitted, the offenses
committed by his troops, it was further insisted that he had-in any event-the duty to·
"discover and control" these offenses once they were committed, and failed to do so. A
similar view was taken by the Commission in its findings. In its review of the case the Supreme
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Court emphasized that acommanding officer, particularly in occupied territory, is responsible
for the behavior of his troops. In re Yamashita, 326 U. S. I (1946). But the Court neither
expressly accepted nor rejected the findings of the Military Commission that Yamashita,
even in the absence of knowledge, had the duty to "discover and control" illegal acts of subordinates, and could be held liable for the failure to carry out this duty. Instead, the Court
considered itself as bound by the finding of the Commission on the question of fact, namely,
that Yamashita had known of the offenses being committed by his troops. In view of the state
of disorganization and breakdown of communications in the Philippines at the time, this was
a hotly disputed question-and one of the principal targets of critics of the trial. A further
criticism was that even if Yamashita had known of the atrocities being committed by his
troops he could not have brought a stop to this behavior since American military operations
prevented him from exercising effective control over the members of his command.
In the German High Command Trial (Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others, Law
Reports . . . I2 (I949), pp. 71, 74-9, Io5-r2) the tribunal assumed, with respect to some of
the accused, that actual knowledge was essential to establish responsibility for acts of subordinates. For other defendants, however, it was maintained that the accused "should have
had knowledge" of the offenses, that they had a duty to find out that offenses were being committed and to stop them.-And in the Hostages Trial (Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, Law
Reports ... 8 (I949), p. ?I) the tribunal declared that a Commanding General '' ... is charged
with notice of occurrences taking place within that territory. He may require adequate reports
of all occurrences that come within the. scope of his power and, if such reports are incomplete
or otherwise inadequate, he is obliged to require supplementary reports to apprise him of all
pertinent facts. If he fails to require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty
rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own dereliction as a defense."
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